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REVISITING SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS AND
HOLMES'S LOCHNER DISSENT'
G. Edward Whitet
INRODUCTION
This article is about how one of Holmes's best known opin-
ions, his dissent in Lochner v. New York,' became famous in
spite of itself. If one recreates the ordinary discourse of the
orthodox universe of constitutional jurisprudence in 1905,
when Lochner was decided, it rapidly becomes apparent that
Holmes's dissent was not contributing to that discourse. The
framework from which Holmes approached Lochner, as well as
other cases that have come to be called 'substantive due pro-
cess' cases,2 was not taken seriously in orthodox legal circles.
Holmes, for his part, took the orthodox framework only partial-
ly seriously.
Holmes's dissent only became famous when two of the
ideas he put forth in it began to resonate within the communi-
ty of elite jurists and commentators, which helped make him a
nearly mythical figure.' The first idea was that judges were
giving 'substantive' (normative) readings of the Due Process
-©1997 G. Edward White. All Rights Reserved.
t University Professor and John B. Minor Professor of Law and History,
University of Virginia. My thanks to Barry Cushman, John Harrison, and Charles
McCurdy for their comments on earlier drafts of this article and to Dean Romhilt
for research assistance. My intellectual debt to the scholarship of Professors
Cushman and McCurdy goes well beyond the citations to their work in this
article.
' 198 U.S. 45, 75 (1905).
I will be placing single quotes around the terms "substantive* and "substan-
tive due process" in various places throughout this article. That usage is intended
to demonstrate that Holmes and the great bulk of his juristic contemporaries (he
retired from the Court in 1932) never used the term "substantive due process" at
all
a M , y most recent effort to assess the sudden emergence of Holmes's reputation
in legal and lay circles in the period between the First and Second World Wars is
G. Edward White, The Canonization of Holmes and Brandeis: Epistemology and
Judicial Reputations, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 576 (1995).
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Clauses. The second was that this judicial tendency was a bad
thing for American constitutional jurisprudence.
In comparing the orthodox jurisprudential framework that
dominated the Lochner court with Holmes's framework, and in
seeking to explain why Holmes's framework eventually cap-
tured the attention of commentators, I have encountered two
firmly established mythologies about early twentieth century
constitutional jurisprudence. The first mythology is that the
Lochner majority's reading of the Fourteenth Amendment's
Due Process Clause was a wilful substitution of its own view
on political economy-typically designated as an outmoded
gospel of laissez faire-for the views of the New York legisla-
ture. The second mythology is that by the time newly elected
President Franklin Roosevelt announced a "New Deal" for the
American people in 1933, not only the laissez faire gospel but
all 'substantive' judicial interpretations of open-ended constitu-
tional language were on the defensive. The mythologies com-
bine in a claim that the "constitutional revolution" of the late
1930s and 1940s was a vindication of both of the ideas Holmes
expressed in his Lochner dissent.
When I turned to the relevant sources, I found that nei-
ther of the mythologies bore much resemblance to the actual
relationship between Lochner-style 'substantive due process'
cases and the Court's apparent abandonment of substantive
due process in the allegedly revolutionary 1937 case of West
Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish,4 in which it sustained the consti-
tutionality of a Washington state minimum wage statute
against a Fourteenth Amendment "liberty of contract" claim. I
found that prior to the 1940s, substantive due process cases
were not designated by that term at all. They were designated,
and conceived, as cases testing the boundary between the po-
lice powers of the states and the principle that no legislature
could enact "partial" legislation, legislation that imposed bur-
dens or conferred benefits on one class of citizens rather than
the citizenry as a whole. When courts used the Due Process
Clauses to strike down "social legislation"5 in the late nine-
4 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
' The term "social legislation," employed routinely by European commentators
beginning in the late nineteenth century, referred to legislative measures that
were specifically designed to improve the condition of "less favored classes" in
society. See ERNST FREUND, STANDARDS OF AMERICAN LEGISLATION 22 (1917), quot.
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teenth and early twentieth centuries, they were not thought of
as doing so because they were giving a 'substantive' reading of
those clauses. They were thought of as doing so because the
legislation in question had failed to demonstrate that it was an
appropriately "general" use of the police powers, as distin-
guished from an inappropriately "partial" one.
Holmes's reading of due process cases differed from the
general approach of his contemporaries. He did not place much
significance on maintaining the boundary between police pow-
ers and the obligation of legislatures to not enact "class" or
"partial" legislation. For Holmes, the sovereign power of the
legislature, undergirded by the principle of majority rule in a
democracy, gave legislatures nearly unlimited discretion to
regulate the realm of political economy. Holmes believed that
nearly any piece of legislation could be shown to rest on some
police power. The only limits were arbitrary "takings," where
the property of one citizen was given to another.6 Because he
identified sovereignty so strongly with the legislature in a de-
mocracy, Holmes was skeptical about judicial encroachments
on that sovereignty; he suspected that judges might overreact
to paternalistic legislation because it offended their ideological
convictions. He felt that such overreactions precipitated imper-
missible readings of the Due Process Clauses. Holmes's later
ed in Charles W. McCurdy, "The Liberty of Contract' Regime in American Law, in
FREEDOM OF CONTRACT AND THE STATE (Harry Scheiber ed., forthcoming 1997). Al-
though early twentieth century American 'progressive" commentators consistently
advocated such measures, courts were not typically receptive to them, and "social
legislation" did not become a jurisprudential category until the 19403. See
McCurdy, supra, at 3. The opposition of early twentieth century courts to 'social
legislation" was grounded on an entrenched distinction, in nineteenth and early
twentieth century constitutional jurisprudence, between 'general" and "partial"
legislation. The latter category of legislation, which conferred benefits on particular
classes rather than all citizens, was treated as at the very core of inappropriate
legislative activity. See infra text accompanying notes 14-25.
6 Since writing earlier drafts of this article I have encountered Robert
Brauneis's impressive The Foundation of Our Regulatory Tahings' Jurisprudence:
The Myth and Meaning of Justice Holmes's Opinion in Pennsylvania Coal Compa-
ny v. Mahon, 106 YALE L.J. 613 (1996). Although Brauneis and I disagree on the
precise role of regulatory takings in Holmes's constitutional jurisprudence, see id.
at 677-78, I found Brauneis's careful unpacking of the many strands of Holmes's
perspective both illuminating and generally supportive of the account of the
Lochner dissent I am advancing.
1997]
BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW
admirers came to call what he saw as judicial overreactions
'substantive' interpretations of the Due Process Clauses, using
the term substantive in a pejorative fashion.
Most of Holmes's contemporaries, in contrast, approached
cases in which legislatures attempted to regulate a particular
area of the realm of political economy with two assumptions
deeply embedded in their consciousness. One assumption was
that vast, inexorable forces ruled the economy, and humans
could do little to alter them. A second assumption was that, to
the extent that humans sought to govern one another and
thereby create a "public" sphere in life, this sphere needed to
be narrowly circumscribed because of the tendency of humans
toward tyranny and corruption and because of the general
impotence of humans as causal agents in the universe. These
two assumptions meant that most of Holmes's contemporaries
persistently looked for evidence that legislation was truly "pub-
lic" in nature, conferring equal benefits and burdens on all
citizens and not acting as a pretext for advantaging or
disadvantaging one class. If they concluded that the legislation
was "partial" or "private" in its orientation, they were opposed
to it on principle. Such legislation either smacked of tyranny or
corruption or was a futile effort to tinker with omnipotent
external forces.
I will subsequently trace the evolution of these assump-
tions in nineteenth century constitutional jurisprudence. At
this introductory stage I merely note that Holmes did not
share one of the assumptions and was not much invested in
the other. He did not believe that external forces were as domi-
nant in the universe, and human will as insignificant, as many
of his contemporaries. He rejected even the mild unitarianism
of his father's generation and was convinced that he, at least,
was capable of mastering his environment and affecting his
own destiny. He was not particularly sanguine about "social
legislation"-primarily because he retained some of the deter-
ministic theories of nineteenth century political economy-but
he believed that human beings in power could do what they
wanted up to the point where a majority decided to remove
them. He was more fatalistic about tyranny and corruption
than many other Americans who had been born in 1841, but at
the same time he was fatalistic about the principle of
majoritarianism. His particular consciousness made him read
[Vol. 63: 87
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police power cases in a quite different fashion from his fellow
jurists and commentators. I will now proceed to trace the im-
plications of this epistemological divide between Holmes and
most other judges of his time.7
I. THE "CHARGE OF INEQUALITY" IN LOCHNER: THE ANTICLASS
PRINCIPLE IN NINETEENTH CENTURY POLICE POWERS
JURISPRUDENCE
A. The Origins of the Anticlass Principle
When Holmes dissented in Lochner, he posed a question
that came to be celebrated by his admirers. The question had
two parts. The first part was whether the Constitution's over-
all design embodied a theory of political economy, such as
"paternalism" or "laissez faire." The next part was, if it did
not, whether judges could nonetheless interpret certain open-
ended provisions of the Constitution, such as "liberty" in the
' I will be arguing throughout this article that Holmes's jurisprudential sensi-
bility was essentially modernist, by which I mean that he assumed that the pri-
mary source of causal attribution in the universe was human will rather than
omniscient external phenomena such as religion, nature, or inexorable ']aws of
political economy. Holmes's critique of judicial glosses on constitutional phrases,
such as "liberty" in the Due Process Clauses, flowed from his modernist
epistemological assumptions. "Liberty" was not, for him, a prepolitical, universal
concept, but one whose meaning was supplied by human actors and could change
with time. Because he held this view of the role of human agency in constitutional
interpretation, Holmes worried about the potential contradiction between judicial
glossing and democratic theory, and sought to erect constraints on what later gen-
erations would call "substantive" judging.
Although this view of Holmes is widely shared, its association with modern-
ism may be taken as implying that Holmes wholly affirmed the primacy of hu-
man-centered causation and thus denied any external constraints on policymaking.
To draw such an inference would be to distort Holmes's views. In many areas,
most predominantly that of political economy, Holmes retained a faith in the inevi-
tability of external forces. For example, Holmes thought that most legislation that
sought to redistribute economic benefits was futile: the economic universe was
dominated by inexorable 'laws," such as the inherent limits on any available
"wage fund" imposed by population growth. Although Holmes denied the
intelligibility of essentialist external principles in law, he acted as if such princi-
ples retained an intelligibility in other realms. Hence he could launch a critique of
the judicial doctrine of "liberty of contract without endorsing the efficacy of ini-
tiatives in "social legislation." In short, Holmes can be seen as a transition figure
in the passage from premodernist to modernist epistemological assumptions in
nineteenth and twentieth century America. See also infra note 64.
' Lochner, 198 U.S. at 75.
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Due Process Clauses, as surrogates for particular economic
theories. Holmes answered "no" to the first question (the Con-
stitution was "made for people of fundamentally differing
views") and "no in most cases" to the second.9 Judges were
bound to follow "the natural outcome of a dominant opinion,"
as illustrated by majoritarian legislative policies, even when
such policies affected constitutional provisions, such as the Due
Process Clauses, that were seemingly designed to safeguard
the rights of individuals against governmental interference.
The only instances in which judges could invalidate statutes in
the realm of political economy were when "a rational and fair
man necessarily would admit that the statute proposed would
infringe fundamental principles as they have been understood
by the traditions of our people and our law."0
Holmes's answer to his two-part question in Lochner led
inexorably to his distinctive judicial attitude toward cases
involving constitutional challenges to legislation affecting is-
sues of political economy. Since the overall constitutional de-
sign encompasses no particular theory of political economy,
nearly all judicial efforts to read concepts such as 'liberty" in
the Due Process Clauses as surrogates for any such theory
were merely statements of "convictions or prejudices" on the
part of judges. Making such convictions or prejudices the basis
for finding a piece of legislation constitutionally invalid was
the equivalent of "pervert[ing] the meaning of a constitutional
provision" to "prevent the natural outcome of a dominant opin-
ion.""
When he perceived a statute "would infringe fundamental
principles as they have been understood by the traditions of
our people and our law," Holmes left space for a judicial over-
ride of legislation. But the statute in Lochner was not a candi-
date for "such sweeping condemnation." Merely an effort to
regulate the number of hours worked by employees in the
baking industry in New York, it could have reasonably been
9 Id. at 76.
10 Id.
i' Id.
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conceived of as "a proper measure on the score of health," or a
"first instal[l]ment of a general regulation of the hours of
work."'
Holmes's limited approval of judicial invalidation of legis-
lation affecting issues of political economy raised the question
of what statutes regulating the economy were at risk of being
declared unconstitutional. His language in Lochner did not
give much guidance on that issue, except possibly to suggest
that there were none. He started his analysis by asserting that
the Constitution embodied no overriding theory of political
economy. How, then, could "liberty" in economic due process
cases ever be read as encompassing any "fundamental" eco-
nomic principles? Holmes's Lochner theory of constitutional re-
view of legislation in the realm of political economy appeared
to be the equivalent of judicial abdication of power to the legis-
lature.
But Holmes, in his typically cryptic fashion, intimated at
one possible exception to his Lochner formula of judicial defer-
ence to legislative opinions on issues of political economy. After
characterizing the legislative limitation on working hours in
the baking industry as a labor law, an initial "instal[lment of
a general regulation of the hours of work," he stated that "it
was unnecessary to discuss" whether, if thought of in that
fashion, the statute "would be open to the charge of inequali-
ty."' In this allusion to "inequality" Holmes was pointing to a
fundamental principle of political economy that was taken to
be embodied in the Constitution at the time Lochner was de-
cided. In fact, it is more accurate to say that Holmes's allusion
was to a set of interlocking fundamental principles, principles
that were seen as undergirding the entire enterprise of consti-
tutional government in America. The revolutionary feature of
Holmes's Lochner dissent was his suggestion that, in most
cases involving issues of political economy, foundational con-
stitutional principles are not implicated.
The "charge of inequality" to which Holmes alluded had
been derived from the aforementioned nineteenth century
assumptions about the incapacity of government to regulate
the realm of political economy. Those assumptions posited that
12 Id.
' Lochner, 198 U.S. at 76.
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government could only regulate individual economic activity if
two conditions were satisfied. The regulation in question need-
ed to be directed towards an activity in the "public" sphere of
life, an arena in which the "inalienable" private rights of one
citizen were seen as necessarily coming into contact with the
rights of another, requiring state regulation to protect the
welfare of all citizens. But even where an essential clash of
private rights had suggested that an activity was "public" and
thus presumptively regulable, regulations need to apply equal-
ly to all citizens. Otherwise, governmental regulation of even
"public" economic activity amounted to "partial," "unequal,"
"class" legislation, favoring the interests of one legislative
constituency at the expense of another.14
These interlocking assumptions about the limits of govern-
mental regulation-I shall refer to them, respectively, as the
"public/private distinction" and the "anticlass princi-
ple'--amounted to a reconciliation of two potentially contradic-
tory tendencies in early nineteenth century constitutional ju-
risprudence. One was the establishment of the so-called "vest-
ed rights" principle, embodied in the maxim that a legislative
taking of the property of A and giving it to B without A's con-
sent, violated principles of free republican government." The
archetypal "vested rights" case was one such as Fletcher v.
Peck,"6 in which one legislature granted the title to lands to
one set of persons and a subsequent legislature rescinded that
grant. Nineteenth century jurisprudence assumed that if legis-
latures could infringe on vested rights, one of the foundational
principles of a republican form of government would be sub-
verted.
' It is important not to confuse the requirements that legislation be "general,"
and not "partial" or "unequal," with the modem Equal Protection Clause doctrines
of under-inclusiveness and over-inclusiveness. Those doctrines, the products of
vastly different assumptions about the relationship of legislative activity to individ-
ual rights, do not appear in judicial opinions and commentary until after the Sec-
ond World War.
1 As Justice Samuel Chase put it in Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 388
(1798), a legislative act "that takes property from A and gives it to B" was prohib-
ited by "the very nature of our free Republican governments" and "the great first
principles of the social compact."
16 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810). On Fletcher as a classic "vested rights" case,
see G. EDWARD WHITE, THE MARSHALL COURT AND CULTURAL CHANGE 602-05
(1988).
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But as the American economy expanded in the early nine-
teenth century, and legislatures began to participate in that
expansion by granting commercial franchises for the purposes
of building turnpikes, or bridges, or canals, a second tendency
surfaced. Legislatures began to encourage competitors of origi-
nal franchisors, but the vested rights principle stood in the
way of this development. Nineteenth century courts sought to
reconcile these contradictory tendencies, and at the same time
prevent the complete eradication of the vested rights principle
by establishing the publiclprivate distinction and engrafting
the anticlass principle onto it.17
The anticlass principle was thus derived from two founda-
tional but potentially self-opposing premises of mid-nineteenth
century republican political economy. One premise was that
the legislature had a responsibility to promote economic im-
provements that would increase the prosperity and welfare of
all citizens. The other was that in undertaking promotional
economic development the legislature could not, given the vest-
ed rights principle, exhibit any favoritism toward individual
factions, interests, or classes within the community. The first
premise held out a vision of legislative sponsorship of entrepre-
neurial enterprise so as to further material progress; the sec-
ond refined that vision by insisting that such sponsorship be
administered equally and directed for the benefit of all.1
These dual premises were reflected in a jurisprudential
distinction. Legislative regulations in the "public" sphere that
distributed benefits and burdens equally, and were directed at
promoting the general health, safety, or welfare of the public,
were found within the "police power" of the state and thus con-
17 The classic case is Charles River Bridge u. Warren Bridge Co., U Pet. 420
(1837), in which the United States Supreme Court sustained the constitutionality
of a Massachusetts statute granting a second franchise for a bridge across the
Charles River against a "vested rights" challenge by an existing bridge company.
18 For an accessible recent analysis of the origins and application of the
anticlass principle in Jacksonian theories of political economy, citing earlier mono-
graphic studies, see HOWARD GILLMAN, THE CONSTITUTION BESEIGED 4749 (1993).
Among the relevant sources Gillman cites are Kent Newmyer, Justice Joseph Sto-
ry, The Charles River Bridge Case, and the Crisis of Republicanism, 17 AM. J.
LEGAL HIsT. 232 (1973); Donald J. Pisani, Promotion and Regulation:
Constitutionalism and the American Economy, 74 J. AL HIST. 740 (1987); and
Harry N. Scheiber, Federalism and the American Economic Order, 1789.1910, 10 L.
& SocY' REv. 57 (1975).
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stitutional. 9 In contrast, legislative regulations that singled
out a particular economic activity, however "public" its charac-
ter, for special burdens or benefits, violated the anticlass prin-
ciple and were consequently anti-republican, unconstitutional
takings of property from A for the benefit of B.2"
For example, in the two decades before the Civil War,
state courts permitted general licensing requirements imposed
on entire "public" professions or industries, inspections of prod-
ucts for public health or safety purposes, and location re-
strictions on certain classes of businesses who emitted noxious
fumes or odors.21 At the same time they struck down the use
of eminent domain or taxing powers to benefit individual
banks, mills, or railroads unless a legislature could demon-
strate that the use of those powers conferred benefits on the
community at large.22 As an 1847 Texas opinion put it, the
distinction was between "general public laws, binding all the
members of the community under similar circumstances," and
"partial or private laws, affecting the rights of private individu-
als, or classes of individuals."23
The durability of the anticlass principle, and of the dis-
tinction between permissible "police power" legislation and
impermissible "partial" or "unequal" legislation, was remark-
able. After the Civil War it worked its way into the Fourteenth
19 The first use of the term "police power" that I have found was in Brown v.
Maryland, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 419, 443 (1827). But Chief Justice Marshall's use
of the term did not have the full connotations it later acquired. Compare Mugler
v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 660-61 (1887) and the state cases cited in Scheiber, infra
note 21, and Benedict, infra note 22.
2 And, of course, legislative regulations that affected rights in the "private"
sphere, such as landholdings, were equally anti-republican and unconstitutional,
classic examples of violations of the vested rights principle. Early and mid.nine-
teenth century theories of political economy assumed that legislation initiating
suffrage reform, in which requirements that eligible voters hold freehold land were
abandoned, was consistent with republicanism. But they conceived of legislation
that sought to break up feudal-style estates so as to more equally redistribute
land as paradigmatically anti-republican. See McCurdy, supra note 5, at 9.
21 See Harry Scheiber, Government and the Economy: Studies in the 'Common-
wealth" Policy in Nineteenth-Century America, 3 J. INTERDISC. HIST. 135, 137
(1972).
' See Michael Les Benedict, Laissez Faire and Liberty: A Re-evaluation of the
Meaning and Origins of Laissez-Faire Constitutionalism, 3 L. & HIST. REV. 293,
321-23 (1985).
" Janes v. Reynolds's Adm'rs, 2 Tex. 250 (1847), quoted in GILLMAN, supra
note 18, at 229.
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Amendment's Due Process Clause and became the centerpiece
of police power analysis in the Supreme Court's due process
cases.' As late as the 1890s one is able to find abundant lan-
guage, in both Court opinions and commentary, demonstrating
that the distinction between "general" and "partial" legislation
was still a central focus of analysis in Fourteenth Amendment
challenges to state-sponsored promotional or regulatory legisla-
tion.'
Indeed, the distinction between "general" and "partial"
legislation was the focus of all the justices who decided
Lochner except Holmes. It also informed the discussion of "lib-
erty of contract" that featured prominently in the opinion of
the majority which invalidated the New York statute. To un-
derstand more precisely the relationship between Holmes's
allusion to "the charge of inequality" in Lochner and the
majority's "liberty of contract" argument, it is necessary to take
another excursus through the constitutional principles of po-
litical economy in late nineteenth century American jurispru-
dence.
B. "Free Labor" and the Anticlass Principle
By the time Lochner was decided, a refinement had been
made to the Court's police powers jurisprudence. Legislation
conferring benefits on a particular class of economic actors,
such as that prescribing an eight-hour working day for miners,
could be justified as a legitimate exercise of the police power if
24 See Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887). See also Dent v. West Virginia,
129 U.S. 114, 124 (1889), where Justice Field, for a unanimous Court, declared
that "[l]egislation is not open to the charge of depriving one of his rights without
due process of law, if it be general in its operation upon the subjects to which it
relates . . .
See, e.g., Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133, 137 (1894) (fTo justify the State
in... interposing its authority in behalf of the public, it must appear... that
the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from tho3e of a particular
class, require such interference .. . ."); John F. Dillon, Property-Its Rights and
Duties in Our Legal and Social Systems, 29 AL L. REv. 161, 173-74 (1895) (*The
State ... exists for the general good, for rich and poor alike. It knows or ought
to know no classes .... The blessings and benefits of the State are intended to
diffuse themselves over all... The one thing to be feared in our democratic
republic, and therefore to be guarded against with sleepless vigilance, is class
power and class legislation .... Class legislation of all and every kind is anti-
republican and must be repressed.").
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the class of actors was engaged in a dangerous or unhealthy
occupation. The legislation became a public health measure,
rather than one furthering "class" interests, because the health
and safety of members of the public was a concern of all citi-
zens. An eight-hour day for miners was upheld by the Supreme
Court as an appropriate public health measure;2" the statute
challenged in Lochner sought to do the same for employees in
the bakery trade.
The context of Lochner suggests that the case was per-
ceived as something of a crossroads for due process-police pow-
ers jurisprudence. The Court's opinion in the miners case re-
vealed the surfacing, in late nineteenth century police powers
cases, of arguments that burdensome working hours in certain
occupations were a product of the unequal bargaining position
of employees. These arguments were controversial in two
respects. First, they suggested that every labor case in which
the unequal bargaining power of workers could be said to have
produced deleterious effects on their health was capable of
being conceptualized as a police power case. The arguments
threatened, in the labor context, the distinction between "gen-
eral" health legislation and legislation that simply conferred
benefits on the "partial" class of workers."
26 See, e.g., Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366 (1898).
In Holden v. Hardy, for example, Justice Henry Brown stated that where
employees "are ... induced by the fear of discharge to conform to regulations
which their judgment, fairly exercised, would pronounce to be detrimental to their
health or strength," the state might intervene "where the public health demands
that one party to the contract shall be protected against himself." Id. at 397. The
employer in Holden had argued that a statute establishing an eight-hour day for
miners infringed upon the employees' freedom to work as long as they pleased.
Brown responded that "[tihe argument would certainly come with better grace and
greater cogency from the [employees]." Id.
2 As previously noted, contemporary readers may be inclined to confuse the
distinction between "general" and "partial" legislation with modem equal protection
analysis. The "charge of inequality" to which Holmes alluded in Lochner was not
meant as a reference to the Equal Protection Clause. Lochner was conceptualized
as a due process case, rather than an equal protection case, because the state was
seeking to burden the baking industry with regulations that were allegedly "gener-
al," intended as health measures. The rationale of the statute in Lochner did not
rest on a classification of the baking industry as a candidate for labor regulation
where, say, the candle making industry was not, but on a judgment that deleteri-
ous working conditions in the baking industry imposed burdens not just on one
class of actors, but on the general public.
Peckham's majority opinion in Lochner found the legislative judgment about
"general" burdens following from labor conditions in the baking industry to be
[Vol. 63:87
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The other controversial dimension of arguments associat-
ing "eight-hour day" legislation with the unequal bargaining
position of workers arguably ran even deeper. The defeat of the
South in the Civil War, and the eradication of slavery, had
given momentum to yet another antebellum principle of politi-
cal economy: the principle of "free labor," in which the position
of the worker in an expanding capitalist society was conceived
as unencumbered either by actual slavery or by its status
equivalents. With an abundant supply of free land, opportuni-
ties for geographic mobility, and a growing commercial econo-
my that had abandoned the apprentice system, nineteenth
century American workers were deemed capable of selling
their services for hire on the terms they chose. That those
terms were actually affected by a number of social and econom-
ic constraints on the market for nineteenth century American
laborers did not lessen the attractiveness of the "free labor"
principle.'
Resurrections of the free labor principle in the late
nineteenth century were thus more than cynical efforts to
delegitimate legislation restricting hours of work. Even those
who supported eight-hour day legislation recognized the poten-
tial contradiction between mandated hours and the right of a
worker to offer his services on unencumbered terms. In fact,
the earliest eight-hour day statutes were not compulsory. They
gave workers the option to contract out of the very limitations
they imposed. One reason for the opt-out provisions may have
been a concern that a compulsory reduction in hours would
likely result in a reduction in wages. But there is evidence that
supporters of the eight-hour day movement also believed that
mandatory limitations on employers and employees offended
the free labor principle." Thus the conceptualization of a
either unfounded or pretextual. He therefore concluded that the statute was "par-
tial" and violated the anticlass principle. If one were to employ contemporary ter-
minology, one might say that the central question for Peckham in Lochner was not
why bakers were being treated differently from other economic actors, but why
bakers should not be afforded fundamental private rights, as embodied in the
baseline entitlement of liberty of contract."
On the emergence of the 'free labor principle see generally, ERIC FONER,
FREE SOIL, FREE LABOR, FREE MEN: THE IDEOLOGY OF THE REPUBLICAN PART
BEFORE THE CIVIL WAR (1970); DAvID MONTGMERY, CITIZEN WORkER THE EXPE-
RIENCE OF WORKERS IN THE UNrrED STATES WrTH DEMOCRACY AND THE FREE MAR-
:ET DURING THE NINETEENTH CENTURY (1993).
" See McCurdy, supra note 5, at 13-14 (citing statutes in Wisconsin, New
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piece of legislation as a "labor" rather than a "public health"
measure had a number of ramifications, particularly if the
legislation was associated with arguments based on the in-
equality of bargaining power in an industry. 1
The question of whether the statute in Lochner was a
"public health" or a "labor" measure was thus seen as central
to the decision of its constitutionality. The statute had been
passed against a backdrop of labor unrest and reformist activi-
ty in New York, and had been characterized as an effort to
force non-union bakeries to adhere to the same eight-hour
workdays that unions in the bakery trade demanded.32 It was
included in the labor section, as distinguished from the public
health regulations, of the New York statutes at large.33 Coun-
sel for Joseph Lochner, the bakery owner challenging the stat-
ute, argued that "[it] was never intended as a health provision
but was purely a labor law."'
II. "LrBERTY OF CONTRACT," THE ANTICLASS PRINCIPLE, AND
THE PUBLIC/PRIVATE DISTINCTION
The Court's majority decision in Lochner has, of course,
come to be perceived as notorious. It has been characterized as
an example of judicial invocation of the doctrine of "liberty of
contract," in the apparently ironic setting of early twentieth
century labor relations, to prevent a state from helping out
bakers who lacked the bargaining power to avoid working very
lengthy hours. The irony of the liberty of contract argument
was highlighted by Holmes, who attacked the doctrine as a
judge-made formula that embodied a "particular economic
York, Connecticut, Illinois, Pennsylvania, California, and Missouri).
31 GILLMAN, supra note 18, at 115-19, points out the appearance of articles in
law reviews in the 1890s suggesting that, given the vast inequalities in bargaining
power between employers and employees in many sectors of the market in the last
decade of the nineteenth century, the state had a responsibility to intervene to
alleviate the condition of wage earners. For examples, see GILLMAN, supra note 18,
at 248 nn. 27-35.
32 See George G. Groat, The Eight Hour and Prevailing Rate Movement in New
York State, 21 POL. SCI Q. 414 (1906); Sidney G. Tarrow, Lochner Versus New
York: A Political Analysis, 5 LAB. HIST. 277 (1964).
See GILLMAN, supra note 18, at 126.
" See Argument and Brief for Plaintiff in Error, quoted in GILLMAN, supra
note 18, at 127.
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theory" and thus had no constitutional legitimacy. The wide-
spread endorsement of Holmes's attack has been the principal
source of Lochners notoriety. But a closer look at the other
opinions in Lochner, and at the contemporary reaction to the
case, suggests that the analytical linchpin of the decision, for
all the justices save Holmes, was not the "liberty of contract"
doctrine. It was the anticlass principle informed by the heri-
tage of "free labor" theory. The anticlass principle was thought
of as embedded in a constitutional regime in which judges
were expected not to defer to legislatures except where legisla-
tion was obviously encompassed within the police powers.
A. The Role of Due Process Liberties in Police Power Cases:
Orthodox Analysis
The conceptual framework in which all the justices save
Holmes placed Lochner was that of conventional police power
analysis. That analysis juxtaposed due process "liberties,"
along with their appropriate theoretical baggage, against the
powers of the state to protect the health, safety, and morals of
the public at large. The judiciary was asked to determine, as
Justice Peckham put it for the majority in Lochner, whether a
statute allegedly infringing upon due process liberties was "a
fair, reasonable, and appropriate exercise of the police power of
the State."35 Given the context of Lochner, such a judicial in-
quiry into the "reasonableness" of the legislation would be in-
formed by two propositions: first, the "free labor" theory of
labor relations and, second, the set of late nineteenth and early
twentieth century cases where the Court had concluded that
legislative restrictions on the hours of work were appropriate
public health measures.
So Peckham began his majority opinion in Lochner by
postulating, on the one hand, that "the statute necessarily
It is important to realize that conventional police power analysis was not
"balancing" in the modem sense of the term. It was categorical reasoning: an
activity was placed in one category ("private") or another ("affected with a public
interest"), and the resolution of the issue of constitutionality followed. If the activi-
ty was "private," legislation restricting it was "arbitrary"; if the legislation had a
"public purpose" or the activity was 'affected with a public interest,' the legisla-
tion was "reasonable." Cf. T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in the Age of
Balancing, 96 YALE L.J. 943 (1987).
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interferes with the right of contract between the employer and
the employe[e]s," and, on the other, that "property and liberty
are held on such reasonable conditions as may be imposed by
the governing power of the State in the exercise of ... police
powers, [which] relate to the safety, health, morals and general
welfare of the public." The central inquiry, for Peckham, re-
duced itself to
[W]hen the State... in the assumed exercise of its police powers,
has passed an act which seriously limits the right to labor or the
right of contract in regard to their means of livelihood between per-
sons ... which shall prevail,-the right of the individual to labor for
such time as he may choose, or the right of the State to prevent the
individual from laboring... beyond a certain time prescribed by the
State.3'
For Peckham the answer to that question depended on the
central purpose of the challenged legislation: whether it was
the preservation of the health or safety of the general public,
or the preservation of the health and safety of a particular
class of persons. If the purpose of legislation was to promote
the general welfare by protecting a particularly vulnerable
class of workers, it could come within the police power, as in
the case of hours legislation for miners. But if the class of
workers singled out had no special vulnerability, the legisla-
tion ceased being a "general" health or welfare measure and
became a "partial" measure directed at a particular class, a "la-
bor" statute.
Once those distinctions in police power jurisprudence were
taken to be controlling, the conclusion that the Lochner statute
was unconstitutional quickly followed. The law challenged in
Lochner was directed at bakers, a trade that was "not an un-
healthy one to that degree which would authorize the legisla-
ture to interfere with the right to labor." The public interest in
"clean and wholesome bread" did "not depend upon whether
the baker works but ten hours per day or only sixty hours a
week." The legislation could thus not fairly be termed a public
health measure. And "[vliewed in the light of a purely labor
law, with no reference whatever to the question of health," it
violated the anticlass principle and the free labor principle. Its
"real object and purpose" were "simply to regulate the hours of
" Lochner, 198 U.S. at 54.
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labor between the master and his employees... in a private
business." It amounted to a "mere meddlesome interfer-
ence[, ... with the rights of the individual" in a context in
which freedom to sell one's services was as important as free-
dom to buy them. 7
Chief Justice Melville Fuller and Justices David Brewer,
Henry Brown, and Joseph McKenna joined Peckham's opinion.
Justice John Harlan's dissent in Lochner, joined by Justices
Edward White and William Day, adopted the same conceptual
apparatus. The difference between the two opinions centered
on the characterization of the New York statute. Because
Harlan, White, and Day were convinced that in baking estab-
lishments "labor in excess of sixty hours during a week...
may endanger the health of those who thus labor," they were
inclined to treat the legislation as a public health measure.
They were also inclined to believe, more controversially, that
"[sihorter hours of work, by allowing higher standards of com-
fort and purer family life, promise to enhance the industrial ef-
ficiency of the wage-working class." s That belief suggested
that even "class" legislation might not offend the anticlass
principle if some general public good (industrial efficiency)
followed from it.
B. The Role of Due Process Liberties in Police Power Cases:
Holmesian Analysis
Holmes's dissent posited a radically different conception of
the role of the judiciary in police power cases and indeed in the
entire constitutional regime of political economy. That concep-
tion was framed by two starting assumptions: "state consti-
7 Id. at 61.
"Id. at 71. Harlan's dissent also appealed to federalism and separation of
powers principles, which he invoked in support of the constitutionality of police
regulations enacted in good faith. Id. at 73-74. Arguments that the federal judicia-
ry should not treat the Fourteenth Amendment as a charter to redefine the bal-
ance of federalism were familiar ones in post-Civil War constitutional jurispru-
dence, dating back to The Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873).
Those arguments were not directed toward the sanctity of private rights in the
context of legislative regulation. The disagreements between the justices who
joined Harlan's opinion in Lochner and those who joined Peckham's opinion can
thus be seen as different in kind from the disagreements between Holmes and all
of his Lochner colleagues.
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tutions and state laws may regulate life in many ways which
we as legislators might think as injudicious or if you like as
tyrannical as [the statute in Lochner]," and "the word 'liberty'
in the Fourteenth Amendment is perverted when it is held to
prevent the natural outcome of a dominant opinion.""9 The
Constitution did not embody a particular economic theory, so
judges could not use its provisions to implement one. The free
labor principle, as embodied in the liberty of contract doctrine,
was subject to "the right of a majority to embody their opinions
in law." Not being members of that majority-being unelected
officials who were distinct from legislators-judges needed to
defer to legislative judgments in most cases. "Police power"
was simply a fiction that made such deference palatable.
Between 1905 and 1909 not a single analysis of the
Lochner case in a legal periodical felt compelled to allude to
the conception of judicial review articulated in Holmes's dis-
sent.40 And between 1909 and the 1920s the recognition that
Holmes had, as Edward Corwin put it, "cut... through the
momentary question of policy [in Lochner] to the deeper,
though inarticulate, major premise underlying all preference
for or against the popular will when it appears arrayed against
private rights," was confined to a few "progressive" intellectu-
als.41 In that time period, commentators' prevailing conceptu-
alization of cases such as Lochner was dominated by the issue
Holmes had cavalierly dismissed at the close of his Lochner
dissent: "the charge of inequality" as embodied in the anticlass
" Lochner, 198 U.S. at 76.
0 Holmes's old friend Frederick Pollock did note, in a 1905 article in the Law
Quarterly Review, that "we are much inclined to agree with Mr. Justice Holmes,"
but Pollock meant that he saw no reason to dispute the New York legislature's
premise that hours legislation in the baking industry promoted the health of the
general public. Frederick Pollock, The New York Labour Law and the Fourteenth
Amendment, 21 L.Q. REV. 211, 213 (1905). "English lawyers," Pollock wrote, "are
perhaps naturally prejudiced in favor of the competence of legislatures." Id. at 212.
One lay periodical, The Outlook, an organ of the Progressive movement, sug-
gested that Holmes's dissent "had gone even more fundamentally into the question
at issue" than that of Harlan. 79 THE OUTLOOK 1017, 1018 (1905). But The Outlo.
ok did not elaborate on what it meant by that comment. Id. at 1018.
41 See Edward S. Corwin, The Supreme Court and the Fourteenth Amendment,
7 MICH. L. REV. 643, 669 (1909). On the evolution of Holmes's Lochner dissent to
"classic" status among progressive intellectuals between 1909 and the 1920s, see
G. EDWARD WHITE, JUSTICE OLIVER WENDELL HOimES: LAW AND THE INNER SELF
364-65 (1993).
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principle. As early as 1905, Ernst Freund, a critic of the major-
ity decision in Lochner, suggested that had the New York stat-
ute "claimed to be a measure for the social and economic ad-
vancement of bakers' employees," it "would doubtless have
been open to the objection of being partial or class legisla-
tion.' As late as 1920, Jefferson Browne continued to assert
that "legislation in favor of a class is as obnoxious as legisla-
tion against a class,.., and there must be no special law for a
particular person or a particular class." 3
C. "Liberty of Contract" and the Public/Private Distinction
"Liberty of contract" in due process cases was thus not
simply a surrogate for an ideology of "laissez faire," as distin-
guished from one of "paternalism," as Holmes's dissent sug-
gested. It was a surrogate for a more complicated set of inter-
locking assumptions about the way in which a republican con-
stitutional regime functioned in the area of political economy.
The reason that statutes such as the one in Lochner were con-
ceived by justices such as Peckham as "mere meddlesome in-
terferences ... with the rights of the individual" was that the
constitutional regime of political economy was predicated on
the existence of certain inviolate conceptual spheres.
Most fundamental of those spheres was a sphere of
prepolitical "private" rights that were presumed to be immune
from governmental interference: the term "liberty" signified the
domain of that sphere. But private rights collided with public
powers and obligations, as embodied by government. In the
course of exercising powers and responding to obligations,
government became endowed with some "rights" itself, at least
as trustee for the public at large. So a "public" sphere existed
alongside the "private" sphere, and the term "police powers"
signified the hegemony of government within that sphere.
The coexistence of the "private" and "public" spheres
meant that some adjustments to their boundaries were re-
42 Ernst Freund, Limitation of Hours of Labor and the Federal Supreme Court,
17 GREEN BAG 411, 417 (1905). Freund did not distinguish between the dissents of
Holmes and Harlan, treating both of them as suggesting that Lochner was "an
issue of judgment, and the New York courts had approved of the judgment of the
legislature." Id. at 416.
Jefferson B. Browne, The Super-Constitution, 54 AM. L. REV. 321, 342 (1920).
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quired. That was the task of the judiciary in a constitutional
republic. In order to guide judges in the boundary disputes
that police power cases signified, nineteenth century constitu-
tional jurisprudence reemphasized the governing "first princi-
ples" of republican government that established the initial
regime of spheres and boundaries in the realm of political
economy. One such principle, the anticlass principle, was taken
to further prepolitical "liberty" by preventing legislatures from
conferring special benefits or burdens on citizens. Its invoca-
tion by judges helped clarify the "public/private" boundary.
The doctrine of "liberty of contract" in police power cases
such as Lochner was both a surrogate for prepolitical private
rights and a reassurance that a private sphere remained, pre-
sumptively incapable of being infringed upon by government,
to which legislation ordinarily could not extend. The test for
whether legislation could invade that sphere was twofold:
whether the subject of the legislation was properly "public,"
potentially invoking police powers; and, if so, whether the
legislation was appropriately "general," so that it benefited and
burdened all citizens equally.
In Lochner, all of the justices save Holmes took each of the
above interlocking assumptions to be valid. They simply ap-
plied the constitutional standard for police power cases differ-
ently. The majority scrutinized the New York legislation and
found that it could not legitimately be directed at the public
sphere of political economy because it was not a "reasonable"
exercise of the police power. None of the "appropriate" ratio-
nales for police power legislation was present, rationales that
would have enabled that legislation to be classified as "gener-
al" rather than "partial." Since no appropriate rationale was
present, the legislation was simply a "labor law" that imposed
unequal benefits and burdens on a class of persons, those en-
gaged in the baking industry. By doing so, it took money from
some employers and employees, and gave it to others. It was a
violation of "free labor" in the deepest sense of the word. It was
a violation of the vested rights principle.
The dissent concluded that the New York statute was a
legitimate health measure because bakers were like miners
and other persons engaged in dangerous or unhealthful occu-
pations. Legislation limiting the hours of employees in baker-
ies was thus an appropriate and reasonable method of promot-
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ing their health, thereby improving the general welfare, since
lower working hours were associated with increasing industrial
efficiency and decreasing the number of unhealthy members in
the general population. While hours legislation in the baking
industry did not distribute specific benefits and burdens
equally among the entire population, it distributed equally the
general benefits and burdens of living and working in an in-
dustrializing society. Although it was an interference with
"liberty," it was not a violation of the anticlass principle. It was
an appropriate exercise of the police power.
II. ORTHODOX POLICE POWER ANALYSIS AND 'SUBSTANTIVE
DUE PROCESS'
I have set forth the approach of Holmes's colleagues to the
issues raised in Lochner at some length, while devoting com-
paratively little attention to Holmes's own approach. I have
done so to foreshadow the comparative insignificance of 'sub-
stantive due process' as a jurisprudential concept in the late
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. As a starting propo-
sition, the almost nonexistent status of the phrase 'substantive
due process' in the constitutional lexicon of that time period
can be demonstrated by quantitative analysis.
I surveyed judicial cases and commentary over a period
beginning with the Lochner dissent and extending through the
early 1950s. The results of that survey can be summarized as
follows. Commentators, from at least 1909 on, demonstrated an
awareness that the Supreme Court was giving a broad reading
to the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause and ar-
gued that the original meaning of "due process" had been limit-
ed to procedure in criminal cases, so that "liberty" meant only
a freedom from bodily restraint." They also suggested that in
expanding the meaning of "due process" in cases such as
Lochner the Court was encroaching on legislative
prerogatives. 5 Finally, commentators identified the Court's
" See Corwin, supra note 41, at 664; Charles Grove Harnes, Judicial Review of
Legislation in the United States and the Doctrines of Vested Rights and of Implied
Limitations on Legislatures, 2 TEX. L. REV. 257, 272 (1924); ROBERT E. CUSHmiN,
LEADING CONSTITUTONAL DECISIONS 79 (2d ed. 1929).
' Corwin, supra note 41, at 670; Robert E. Cushman, The Social and Econom-
ic Interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment, 20 MICH. L REV. 737, 741-42
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interpretive attitude toward "due process" with what they
called the "principles of. . . individualism and . . . [l]aissez
[flaire .... .46 But throughout the 1930s they continued to
characterize Lochner-type cases as police powers cases, al-
though they began to make a distinction between 'substantive'
and 'procedural' due process issues.47
There is no evidence of language in federal court cases
using the phrase "substantive due process," or even any at-
tempts to distinguish 'substantive' from procedural readings of
the Due Process Clauses, until 1935. That year, in Schechter
Poultry Corp. v. United States,48 counsel for the petitioner, in
the course of attacking the constitutionality of the National
Industrial Recovery Act ("NIRA"), asserted that the "Act at-
tempts to override and ignore... the constitutional guarantees
of substantive due process under the Fifth Amendment . . .
,4' But in elaborating on that assertion, he referred to the
"method or procedure" established by the NIRA, which he
claimed "makes no provision for notice... [or] for a hearing..
. ."5 So there does not seem to have been a clear distinction
between the 'substantive' and 'procedural' dimensions of the
Due Process Clauses in cases as late as the mid 1930s.
Eventually, in the 1940s, federal courts began to use the
phrase "substantive due process" in their opinions. 1 But as
late as 1948, when the phrase appeared for the first time in a
Supreme Court case,52 it was still being used to convey a dis-
(1922).
46 Corwin, supra note 41, at 646; Cushman, supra note 45, at 744-46.
On the continued use of the "police powers" designation for Lochner-style
cases, see Robert E. Cushman, Constitutional Law in 1940-1941: The Constitutional
Decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States in the October Term, 1940, 36
AM. POL. SCI. REV. 263, 280-83 (1942). For evidence of a nascent recognition, at
the same time, of a distinction between 'procedural' and 'substantive' due process
issues, see ROBERT E. CUSHMAN & SAMUEL P. ORTH, AMERIcAN NATIONAL Gov.-
ERNMENT 141-42 (1931); EDWARD S. CORWIN, COURT OVER CONSTITUTION 107-09
(1938).
48 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
" Id. at 501-02.
'0 Id. at 503.
"1 For examples, see National Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 132 F.2d 545, 549-50
(D.C. Cir. 1942); Ochikubo v. Bonesteel, 60 F. Supp. 916, 923 (S.D. Cal. 1945);
United States v. General Petroleum of California, 73 F. Supp. 225, 252 (S.D. Cal.
1946).
2 Republic Natural Gas v. Oklahoma, 334 U.S. 62, 90 (1948) (Rutledge, J., dis-
senting).
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tinction, as an opinion in the District of Columbia Circuit put
it, between "legislation and procedure" and 'judicially adopted
rules of substantive law."' That is, 'substantive due process'
did not refer to broad judicial readings of the Due Process
Clauses, but to the kinds of rights that were affected in a due
process challenge to legislation. Those rights need not originate
in the realm of political economy, as a concurrence by Justice
Stanley Reed in the case of Beauharnais v. Illinois( demon-
strated. Reed described Beauharnais, a case challenging the
constitutionality of an Illinois group libel statute on First and
Fourteenth Amendment grounds, as a 'substantive due process'
case because the petitioner's 'substantive' First Amendment
rights applied against the states, having been incorporated in
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.'
The designation 'substantive due process' for the line of
Lochner-type police power cases seems therefore to have origi-
nated in a shorthand oversimplification made by commentators
Hund v. Hodge, 162 F.2d 233, 240 (D.C. Cir. 1947) (Edgerton, J., dissenting).
343 U.S. 250 (1952).
IL at 277. A similar confluence of political economy cases and other cases in
which the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment was taken to include
'substantive! rights can be seen in the 1937 and 1950 editions of NOEL T.
DOWLING, CASES ON CONSTruTIoNAL LAW. In the 1937 edition Dowling grouped
cases involving the Due Process Clause into the categories of 'Due Process As Af-
fecting Matters of Procedure" and 'Due Process As Affecting Matters of Sub-
stance." In the latter category he included political economy cases such as Coppage
v. Kansas and West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish; he also included free speech cases,
such as Gitlow v. New York and De Jonge v. Oregon. Id. at xiv, xv.
By his 1950 edition Dowling had come to treat cases involving the Due Pro-
cess Clauses under the general heading 'Preservation of Individual Rights," in
contrast to his earlier general heading "Limitations on the Powers of Government.'
Compare DOWLING, 1937 ed., at xiv, with DOWLING, 1950 ed., at xviii He also
grouped his category of now-designated 'Substantive Due Process cases into sec-
tions, one including "Regulation of Economic Affairs" (political economy cases), and
two others including "Freedom of Speech, Press, and Assembly" and 'Freedom of
Religion.' DOWLING, 1950 ed., xviii, xix. In an introductory note to the freedom of
speech, press and assembly cases Dowling wrote the following, which perfectly
captures the status of 'substantive due process' as a conceptual term in the early
1950s:
The title, "substantive due process," is somewhat arbitrary, but in the
present stage of the development of constitutional law . . . it compre-
hends most of the questions considered in the cases in this section; and
it helps to emphasize the distinction, previously noted, in the judicial
methods used in liberty of mind cases, on the one hand, and economic
affairs cases, on the other.
Id. at 925.
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after the 1950s. In that oversimplification, Holmes's critique of
orthodox police power analysis in the realm of political econ-
omy, which he claimed led to inappropriately broad readings of
the term "liberty," was confused with an emerging sense that
"due process," especially after some Bill of Rights provisions
had been judicially incorporated against the states, could refer
to 'substantive' as well as 'procedural' guarantees. This confu-
sion was itself a signal of the emergence of Holmes's critique to
mainstream jurisprudential status. Those who internalized
Holmes's critique eventually came to use the phrase
'substantive due process' as a pejorative term, designating
cases in which courts had inappropriately injected
'individualism' and 'laissez faire' views into their readings of
"liberty" in due process cases. In the process the designation of
Lochner-style cases as police power cases, the one employed by
Holmes and his contemporaries, was lost. The next question to
be addressed is why this development occurred.
A. The Jurisprudential Basis of Holmes's Critique of Orthodox
Police Power Jurisprudence
By the time Holmes wrote his dissent in Lochner, his
philosophical views on sovereignty in a republic, as well as his
jurisprudential views on the scope of judicial review in cases
testing the constitutional limits of legislative regulation in the
arena of political economy, had coalesced into their mature
versions. He was, by 1905, a thoroughgoing positivist, a disci-
ple of legislative supremacy in the American constitutional
republic, and a persistent skeptic about the integrity of judi-
cially created constitutional imperatives. These tendencies led
him to characterize judicial searches for conceptual boundaries
in police power cases as, in the main, either self-deluded or
arrogant exercises. A passage from an unpublished draft of his
opinion for the Court in the 1914 case of Keokee Consolidated
Coke Co. v. Taylor 6 shows his approach toward "liberty of
contract" cases in sharp relief:
Whatever freedom of contract may be deduced from the word liberty
in the Amendment, it is subject to restrictions in the interest of
what the legislature conceived to be the general welfare .... It now
66 234 U.S. 224 (1914).
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is recognized by legislatures and courts as well as by everyone out-
side of them, that as a fact freedom may disappear on the one side
or the other through the power of aggregated money or men; ...
and to suppose that every other force may exercise its compulsion at
will but that government has no authority to counteract the pres-
sure with its own is absurd. It is said that the power of duress has
changed sides and is now with [organized labor]. But it if be admit-
ted, as it certainly is established, that the legislature may interfere
with theoretic in the interest of practical freedom, it would require a
very clear case before a court could declare its judgment wrong and
its enactment void."
For Holmes "liberty of contract," itself a judge-made doc-
trine, was held subject to almost limitlessly broad police pow-
ers. This was because the conception of "freedom" that lay
behind "liberty of contract" was itself an illusion. "Freedom"
could be restricted by money, power, or politics. A legislature,
responding to any or all of those forces, could decide, in cases
such as Lochner, to protect the "practical" interests of public
health or industrial efficiency at the expense of the "theoretic"
freedoms embodied in the free labor ideal and the liberty of
contract doctrine. Holmes did not think that the judicial role in
constitutional cases such as Lochner should be to discern
whether legislation purportedly exercising police powers was
"general" or "partial." He fully expected a legislature to be
furthering the "freedom" of some interests at the expense of
others. The judicial role was rather to determine whether such
legislation could reasonably have been thought by the legis-
lature to have been accomplishing something other than a
naked transfer of property or resources from A to B. If pur-
ported police power legislation was not patently arbitrary in
that fashion, the fact that it could be conceptualized as inter-
fering with "liberty of contract," and a judicial surmise that it
might not be wise social policy, were constitutionally irrele-
vant. Hours legislation bore enough resemblance to public
health or general welfare rationales to survive this quite re-
laxed standard.
Draft of opinion of the Court, Keokee Consolidated Coke Co. v. Taylor, 234
U.S. 224 (1914), microfilmed on Oliver Wendell Holmes Papers, (University of Vir-
ginia School of Law 1985). I am indebted to Charles McCurdy for calling this
draft opinion to my attention. See also ALEXANDER M BIcKEr & BENNO C. ScH-
MIDT, JR., THE JUDICIARY AND RESPONSIBLE GOVERNMENT 297-98 (1984).
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In Holmes's view then, most of the 'substance' read into
the term "liberty" in the Due Process Clauses was inappropri-
ate judicial gloss. It presupposed limits on the capacity of legis-
latures to interfere with freedom in the realm of political econ-
omy, when in reality there were very few such limits. The
responses of legislatures to infringements on freedom caused
by money, power, or politics were, in most cases, appropriate
responses. Legislatures were majoritarian institutions, courts
were not, and in Holmes's judgment the American Constitu-
tion, by the opening of the twentieth century, was a document
functioning in a society predicated on majority rule.
Several of Holmes's colleagues on the Court in 1914 were
provoked by the passage from his Taylor opinion quoted above.
Their shared concern, expressed in different ways, was that
Holmes's blithe acceptance of the ability of legislatures to "in-
terfere with theoretic in the interest of practical freedom"
would encourage a spate of regulatory legislation. Holmes, who
was used to his fellow justices objecting when he called a
spade a spade too openly, withdrew the passage. 8 But
Holmes's reading of due process cases as raising a question of
the extent to which judicial glosses on constitutional language
could be justified in a majoritarian democracy eventually
emerged as the mainstream reading. By 1965, in Griswold v.
Connecticut,59 a majority of the Court had come to endorse
Justice William 0. Douglas's assertion that "we decline [the]
invitation [to treat] Lochner v. State of New York [as] our
guide.... We do not sit as a super-legislature to determine the
58 See BICKEL & SCHMDT, supra note 57, at 298. In 1919 Holmes wrote to
Felix Frankfurter that "innocuous enfantiallages" and "exuberances" in one of his
draft opinions had been eliminated by his colleagues, and "some pap that would
not hurt an infant's stomach" had been substituted. A year later he wrote Felix
Frankfurter that another draft opinion "had a tiny pair of testicles .. . [als origi-
nally written," but "the scruples of my Brethren have caused their removal and it
speaks in a very soft voice now." Holmes was well aware of his tendency to prefer
stylistic "elegance and variety" to jurisprudential caution in his opinions, and typi-
cally withdrew his more pungent phrases with equanimity, retaining them for his
extensive private correspondence. See Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes to Felix
Frankfurter (Oct. 24, 1920), and Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes to Felix
Frankfurter (Nov. 30, 1919), microfilmed on Oliver Wendell Holmes Papers, supra
note 57. Both letters are quoted in BICKEL & SCHMIIDr, supra note 57, at 237. On
Holmes's letter writing practices, see G. Edward White, Holmes As Correspondent,
43 VAND. L. REV. 1707 (1990).
" 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
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wisdom, need, and propriety of laws that touch economic prob-
lems, business affairs, or social conditions.'
B. The Resonance of Holmes's Critique
In 1913, in an essay in The Survey, Felix Frankfurter
articulated an epistemological perspective that found Holmes's
reading resonant, ultimately transforming its status from idio-
syncratic to prophetic. Frankfurter said, of the context in
which decisions on political economy were being made,
[t]he tremendous economic and social changes of the last fifty years
have inevitably reacted upon the functions of the state. More and
more government is conceived as the biggest organized social effort
for dealing with social problems .... Growing democratic sympa-
thies, justified by the social message of modern scientists, demand to
be translated into legislation for economic betterment, based upon
the conviction that laws can make men better by affecting the condi-
tions of living. We are persuaded that evils are not inevitable, and
that it is the business of statesmanship to tackle them step by step,
tentatively, experimentally .... .
Certain evocative terms signified Frankfurter's
consciousness in the passage. The most crucial of those were
embedded in the sentences "laws can make men better by
affecting the conditions of living," and "evils are not inevita-
ble." The world that Frankfurter portrayed was one marked by
"tremendous economic and social changes," by "growing demo-
cratic sympathies," and by "the social message of modem scien-
tists." Taken together, Frankfurter suggested, these develop-
ments produced the conclusion that government was the appro-
priate "social effort" to deal with social problems.
Frankfurter's conclusion, however, was not axiomatic.
Earlier generations of American legal and social theorists had
reacted to perceptions of "tremendous economic and social
changes" without concluding that government should be the
primary mechanism to respond to those changes.62
"Id. at 481-82. For an analysis of the relationship between Holmxeas critique
of the Lochner majority opinion and the Warren Court's tacit revival of substantive
due process in noneconomic "fundamental rights" cases, see G. EDWARD WHITE,
THE Al ERICAN JUDICIAL TRADITION 406-07 (2d. ed. 1988).
61 THE SURVEY, Jan. 1913, at 3, reprinted in FELIX FRANKTURTER, LAW AND
PoLICS 4 (Archibald Maceish & Edward F. Prichard eds., 1962).
The early years of the nineteenth century were marked by a comparable be-
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Frankfurter's enthusiasm for governmental solutions was less
a product of the novelty of the early twentieth century Ameri-
can environment than of an altered consciousness about the
power of human actors as causal agents.
For Frankfurter and his fellow "progressive"' intellectu-
als, "the social message of modern scientists" and "growing
democratic sympathies" were both evidence of a new confidence
in the capacity of human beings to alter their environment.
Science had provided a new analytical key to the universe, one
that was founded not on the mysteries of divine will but on
empirical observations and deductions conducted by properly
trained human beings. The "social message of modern scien-
tists" was that the same techniques employed to explain and to
predict physical phenomena could be applied to social phenom-
ena. A mastery of such techniques gave humans the power to
control their own destiny. The social and economic policies of
human actors-laws--could alter external conditions and
"make men better"; evils were no longer "inevitable."
The increased importance of human actors as causal
agents in the universe required an increased appreciation of
the worth of individual humans. Democratic theory embodied
this enhanced sense of human worth, and policies designed to
alleviate the rigors of early twentieth century life and to pro-
duce "economic betterment" were consistent with democratic
theory. Since it was no longer necessary to regard the inequali-
ties of condition produced by the industrial marketplace of the
early twentieth century as "inevitable," legislation designed to
ameliorate those inequalities was desirable. The fact that such
legislation increased the presence of government was not a
lief among social commentators that the conditions of life in America were being
rapidly and dramatically transformed. The response, in the realm of constitutional
jurisprudence, was to advocate a shoring up of the existing "first principles" of
American constitutionalism, none of which anticipated an extensive role for gov-
ernment as a regulatory force. See G. EDWARD WHITE, THE MARSHALL COURT AND
CULTURAL CHANGE 6-8 (1988).
3 The term progressive has become sufficiently ubiquitous in current scholar-
ship to require refinement. As used in this article, Progressive refers to allegiance
to the political movement known as Progressivism or to the national Progressive
Party; "progressive" refers to a characterization of the attitudes of early twentieth
century modernist intellectuals by those persons themselves; and 'progressive' re-
fers to a characterization of the attitudes of early twentieth century persons by
current commentators.
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concern, since government was staffed by humans who had re-
ceived "the social message of modern scientists" and the politi-
cal message of democratic theory, and were capable of altering
"the conditions of living" to "make men better." Their efforts
amounted to "progress."
One might contrast the set of interlocking epistemological
assumptions' reflected in Frankfurter's 1912 essay with the
set that lay behind the establishment of the public/private
distinction and the anticlass principle in nineteenth century
jurisprudence. In the latter epistemology, the role of humans
as causal agents was necessarily limited by the omnipotence of
external forces and the incapacity of humans to transcend
their own tendencies toward selfishness and corruption. Hu-
mans had comparatively little freedom to control their own
destiny; given the tyrannical and arbitrary dimensions of gov-
ernance, adding government to the mix only restricted that
freedom further. Policing the boundary between the public and
private spheres, and confining the reach of government only to
those measures that benefited or burdened all citizens equally,
was necessary to preserve human freedom.
In Frankfurter's epistemological outlook, freedom had been
transformed from a protection from arbitrary or tyrannical
governmental interference to an opportunity to have one's
condition in life bettered by affirmative governmental activi-
ty.' Once that shift in the conception of freedom had taken
place, policing the boundary between the public and private
spheres became a less vital task, and legislation conferring
particular benefits on one class in society became less threat-
ening to other classes. A law such as that tested in Lochner
might be a "first instal[llment in a general regulation in the
hours of work," but that "general regulation" had as its pur-
pose the "betterment" of all classes in society. Consequently,
" Elsewhere I have labeled this set of interlocking assumptions "modernist,"
and have treated them as evidence of a "modernist epistemology" or "modernist
consciousness" among persons making them. See, eg., White, supra note 3, at 579-
82; G. Edward White, The First Amendment Comes of Age, 95 MICH. L. REV. 299,
303-06, 355 (1996).
Compare RICHARD T. ELY, STUDIES IN EVOLUTION OF INDUSTRIAL SOCIETY
400-03 (1903) (arguing that "Itirue liberty," which Ely defined as "the expression of
the positive powers of the individual," required state action to regulate "nominally
free contract.")
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the increased encroachment of government on private affairs
through paternalistic legislation was not a cause for concern,
because those drafting the legislation had internalized the
modern messages of science and democratic theory.
The anticlass principle, or for that matter the pub-
lic/private distinction, were thus not essential tenets of those
who shared Frankfurter's modernist epistemological sensibili-
ty. On the contrary, Frankfurter's fellow "progressives" regard-
ed those tenets as potential roadblocks in the path of "positive"
liberty and human improvement. 6 Nor were those tenets, we
have seen, subscribed to by Holmes, who was much less san-
guine than Frankfurter about the substantive worth of "pro-
gressive" legislation, 7 but equally convinced that there were
few constitutional limits on the power of legislatures to enact
it. The relative insignificance of both the public/private distinc-
tion and the anticlass principle in Frankfurter's and Holmes's
approaches to "social legislation" cases played an important
part in the eventual acceptance of Holmes's attack on the
judge-made doctrine of "liberty of contract."
Holmes's critique of Lochner and "liberty of contract" took
hold because commentators and judges, especially from the
1940s on, increasingly came to regard the task of constitutional
interpretation as a purposive, human-centered exercise. One
might compare the approach adopted by all of the judges in
Lochner save Holmes. In Lochner, Justice Peckham, after pos-
iting that the central question in every "police power" due
process case was "[is this a fair, reasonable, and appropriate
exercise of the police power of the State, or ... an unreason-
able, unnecessary and arbitrary interference with the right of
the individual to his personal liberty," added:
This is not a question of substituting the judgment of the court for
that of the legislature. If the act be within the power of the State it
is valid, although the judgment of the court might be totally opposed
to the enactment of such a law. But the question would still remain:
See Breck P. McAllister, Lord Hale and Business Affected with a Public
Interest, 43 HARv. L. REV. 759 (1930); Walton Hamilton, Affectation with Public
Interest, 39 YALE L.J. 1089 (1930).
67 For elaboration of the characterizations of Holmes's views on political econo-
my, see WHITE, supra note 41, at 400-01.
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Is it within the police power of the State? and that question must be
answered by the court."
Peckham seemed to regard the question of whether a par-
ticular piece of legislation came within the police power as
capable of answering itself. This was because he started with
the proposition that unless legislation conferred equal benefits
and burdens on all citizens, it constituted "mere meddlesome
interference... with the rights of the individual." Since it was
obvious which legislative enactments were "general" and which
"partial," it was obvious which were "reasonable" and which
were "arbitrary." In marking out the boundaries between the
police power and the sphere of private autonomy, judges were
merely recognizing the obvious. They were not exercising
'Judgment" in the modern sense of that term.
C. The Persistence of Orthodox Police Powers in Early
Twentieth Century Due Process Cases: Adkins and Parrish
In the decades after Lochner, the Court gave signs of
accommodating itself to "social legislation," sustaining statutes
that prevented workers from contracting out of workers' com-
pensation plans, and in the process sweeping within the police
power what Justice Mahlon Pitney called "the interest of the
public.., in the prevention of pauperism, with its
concomitants of vice and crim6."' The recognition of a public
interest in preventing pauperism seemed tacitly to reject the
view that since individuals were autonomous economic units
there were no social costs of a failure to survive in the market-
place. Pitney's recognition threatened to blur the distinction
between "general" and "partial" legislation and thereby to
undermine the anticlass principle. But it did not signify a
methodological change in the Court's approach to police power
due process cases. Until the mid-1930s, well after Holmes left
the Court, that approach was still the one adopted by Holmes's
eight colleagues in Lochner.
' Lochner, 198 U.S. at 56-57.
New York Cent. R&R. Co. v. White, 243 U.S. 188, 207 (1917); see also Chica-
go, Burlington, & Quincy R.R. Co. v. McGuire, 219 U.S. 549 (1911); Second
Employers' Liab. Cases, 223 U.S. 1 (1912). See the discussion in McCurdy, supra
note 5, at 32-34.
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Consider, for example, Justice George Sutherland's opinion
in the 1923 case of Adkins v. Children's Hospital," testing the
constitutionality of a Congressional statute creating a board to
impose minimum wages for women employed by enterprises in
the District of Columbia. The obvious purpose of the statute
was to redress the diminished market power of women. As
such the legislation appeared easily swept into the category of
antipauperism statutes which the Court had begun to sustain.
But Sutherland, for a 5-3 majority, declined to treat the stat-
ute challenged in Adkins in that fashion. Instead he analyzed
the statute in traditional police power terms, concluding that it
infringed on "liberty of contract." Specifically,
That the right to contract about one's affairs is part of the liberty of
the individual protected by [the Due Process Clauses] is settled by
the decisions of this Court and is no longer open to question....
There is, of course, no such thing as absolute freedom of con-
tract. It is subject to a great variety of restraints. But freedom of
contract is, nevertheless, the general rule and restraint the excep-
tion; and the exercise of legislative authority to abridge it can be
justified only by the existence of exceptional circumstances."
The question Sutherland chose to center upon in Adkins
was whether a statute fixing wages for women was more than
"partial" in nature; whether, for example, it was similar to an
Oregon statute limiting hours for employees in mills, factories,
and manufacturing establishments, which the Court had sus-
tained in a 1917 decision.72 He had no difficulty in showing
that the statute under consideration in Adkins was "partial":
[T]he authority to fix hours of labor cannot be exercised except in
respect of those occupations where work of long continued duration
is detrimental to health....
If now.., we examine and analyze the statute in question,...
[i]t is not a law dealing with any business charged with a public
interest or with public work .... It does not prescribe hours of labor
70 261 U.S. 525 (1923), overruled by West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S.
379 (1937).
71 Id. at 545-46.
72 Bunting v. Oregon, 243 U.S. 426 (1917). Earlier the Court had sustained an
Oregon statute prohibiting the employment of women in laundries and factories for
longer than 10 hours per day, citing the special legislative concerns for a woman's
.performance of her maternal functions." Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412, 421
(1908).
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or conditions under which labor is to be done. It is not for the pro-
tection of persons under legal disability or for the prevention of
fraud. It is simply and exclusively a price-fixing law, confined to
adult women ....
... To the extent that the sum fixed exceeds the fair value of
the services rendered, it amounts to a compulsory exaction from the
employer for the support of a partially indigent person, for whose
condition there rests upon him no peculiar responsibility, and there-
fore, in effect, arbitrarily shifts to his shoulders a burden which, if it
belongs to anybody, belongs to society as a whole.
Adkins is conventionally treated as a hymn to laissez faire
and a testament to Sutherland's ideological conservatism."'
But once again all members of the Court except Holmes "
adopted orthodox police power analysis. To them "liberty of
contract" functioned as a surrogate for the presumption that
government could not interfere with private economic transac-
tions to the betterment or detriment of one party to the trans-
action. Chief Justice William Howard Tafts dissent, joined by
Justice Edward Sanford, described Adkins as another example
of the Court's "pricking out a line" to mark "the boundary of
the police power beyond which its exercise becomes an invasion
of the guaranty of liberty under the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments."76 Only Holmes asserted that "the power of
Congress... to remove conditions leading to ill health, immo-
rality and deterioration of the race... seems absolutely free
from doubt," and "the dogma, Liberty of Contract" presented no
obstacle to that power. "[Piretty much all law consists in for-
bidding men to do some things that they want to do," he sug-
gested, "and contract is no more exempt from law than other
acts."77 For Holmes the inviolate categories that helped fix the
boundary between "public" and "private" spheres in the realm
' Adkins, 261 U.S. at 554-58.
7' JOEL F. PASCHAL, M&P. JusncE SUTHERLAND: A MAN AGAINST THE STATE
119-26 (1951). See also Joel F. Paschal, George Suthedand, 4 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 1837, 1838 (Leonard Levy & Kenneth Karat eds.,
1986) (stating that: 'Once on the Court, Sutherland readily joined his conservative
colleagues invoking substantive due process to strike down exertions of governmen-
tal power.").
"' Justice Louis Brandeis took no part in the decision, and he might well have
joined Holmes's dissent.
76 Adkins, 261 U.S. at 562.
Id. at 568 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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of political economy had been made by humans, and could be
unmade. Each of the other justices in Adkins saw them as far
more transcendent and immutable.
It was this sense of the immutable nature of the categories
of police power analysis that led Sutherland to charge, in his
dissent fourteen years after Adkins in West Coast Hotel Co. v.
Parrish,7" that the majority had adopted a revolutionary ap-
proach to constitutional interpretation. That charge was not
altogether accurate. Hughes, for the majority, began by review-
ing police power cases which had established, as he put it, that
due process "liberties" were subject to "reasonable regulations
and prohibitions imposed in the interests of the community."
He cited cases sustaining statutes "limiting employment in un-
derground mines and smelters to eight hours a day; ... forbid-
ding the payment of seamen's wages in advance;... prohibit-
ing contracts limiting liability for injuries to employees;...
limiting hours of work of employees in manufacturing estab-
lishments; and... maintaining workmen's compensation
laws." "In dealing with the relation of employer and employed,"
Hughes concluded, "the legislature has necessarily a wide field
of discretion in order that there may be suitable protection of
health and safety."7" This was, of course, following the police
power guidelines Pitney had identified.
Hughes also noted in his Parrish opinion, however, that
"[t]he Constitution does not speak of freedom of contract," but
of "liberty without due process of law," a phrase which "has its
history and connotation." He then went on to suggest that part
of the "connotation" of "liberty" in due process cases was "the
economic conditions which have supervened" since the Adkins
decision. Those conditions were relevant to the Court's inquiry
into "the reasonableness of the exercise of the police power of
the State." Indeed they prompted "fresh consideration" of the
State's actions."0 Here was language reminiscent of Holmes's
approach to due process cases.
Sutherland bristled at this last set of statements by
Hughes. "[T]he meaning of the Constitution does not change
with the ebb and flow of economic events," he declared. 'e
78 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
71 Id. at 393.
so Id. at 390, 402.
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frequently are told in more general words that the Constitu-
tion must be construed in the light of the present." But an
important distinction needed to be kept in mind:
If by that it is meant that the Constitution is made up of living
words that apply to every new condition which they include, the
statement is quite true. But to say... that the words of the Consti-
tution mean today what they did not mean when written-that is,
that they do not apply to a situation now to which they would have
applied then-is to rob that instrument of the essential element
which continues it in force .... 81
Hughes, in characteristic fashion, had written an opinion
using the language of established categories of constitutional
jurisprudence to reach an innovative result.' He could have
been taken merely as suggesting that there was ample room,
under the police power, for states to establish minimum wage
levels for chambermaids when lower wages might have pro-
duced pauperism, physical deterioration, or other conditions af-
fecting public health. He could also have been taken as saying,
however, that confidence in the capacity of government to
alleviate conditions that were a product of the industrial mar-
ketplace had changed.'
D. The Demise of the Anticlass Principle
If Hughes intended to convey the latter message in
Parrish, Sutherland was correct in claiming that "the words of
the Constitution mean today what they did not mean when
written."' For whatever "liberty" in the Due Process Clauses
"Id. at 402-03.
2See G. EDwARD WHITE, THE AMERICAN JUDICIAL TRADITIoN 208-09 (2d ed.
1988).
"One could argue that the Court had already gone down part of the road
that Hughes took in Parrish in a series of cases permitting legislative price regu-
lation of businesses "affected with a public interest" See, eg., German Alliance
Ins. Co. v. Lewis, 233 U.S. 389 (1914) (fire insurance); Block v. Hirsh, 256 U.S.
135 (1921) (housing in the context of World War 1). But those examples came
within established categories of enterprises 'affected with a public interest." The
businesses affected in Parrish did not, and thus one could have taken Hughes's
statement to mean that the police power could vary with economic and social
conditions.
" That Hughes did intend to convey the latter message is suggested by his
earlier opinions. For example, in Home Building & Loan Ass'n u. Blaisddl, 290
U.S. 398 (1934), Hughes said, of judicial interpretations of the Contracts Clause,
1997]
BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW
had meant for at least the balance of the nineteenth century, it
had meant that the states were precluded from interfering
with private contractual relations merely because they felt one
party to the contract was not getting a fair shake. For the
state to equalize benefits and burdens in a private contract by
taking money away from one party to that contract and giving
it to the other was the very sort of activity precluded by the
anticlass principle. Protection from such state interference was
at the very heart of "liberty" within the Due Process Clauses.
This was the "charge of inequality" to which Holmes had allud-
ed in his Lochner dissent.
Hughes was suggesting that when economic conditions
changed, the calculus of police power due process cases could
change as well. This suggestion flew in the face of two control-
ling assumptions of established constitutional jurisprudence.
One was that the actions of legislatures, judges, or other hu-
mans could have a substantial effect on economic conditions
themselves; wages, hours, and other dimensions of the econom-
ic marketplace were not fully controlled by immutable forces.
The other was that the boundary between "public" and "pri-
vate" power could shift with the changing social context of
American life; the definition of those activities that were "pub-
lic," and hence within the appropriate range of the police pow-
er, could expand and shrink with the "history and connotation"
of due process.
Thus, if one adopts the categories and the assumptions of
orthodox police power jurisprudence, it was Hughes's opinion
in Parrish, not Sutherland's dissent, that was undertaking a
'substantive' reading of the constitutional concept of due pro-
cess. Hughes's interpretation of the Due Process Clauses was
'substantive' in that it assumed the meaning of concepts such
as "liberty" and "police power" could change with time and
circumstance, and judges could look to the context in which
cases appeared to supply that meaning. Sutherland, by con-
trast, continued to equate due process with the fundamental
republican propositions of the public/private distinction and
'[w]ith a growing recognition of public needs and the relation of individual right to
public security, the Court has sought to prevent the perversion of the clause
through its use as an instrument to throttle the capacity of the states to protect
their fundamental interests." Id. at 443-44.
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the anticlass principle, propositions that were not seen as
originating with judges or as changing with time. Hughes's
reading of "liberty" in the Due Process Clauses as "necessarily
subject to the restraints of due process," or to "regulation
which... is adopted in the interests of the community," trans-
formed "liberty" from an immutable constraint on legislative
regulation to a constraint that could vary with time and cir-
cumstance. In contrast, Sutherland's reading of "liberty" as-
sumed that the concept was "just there": an emblem of funda-
mental precepts of republican government, themselves derived
from the nature of humankind and the omniscience of external
economic forces.
IV. CONCLUSION: REVISITING HoLMEs AND 'SUBSTANTIVE DUE
PROCESS'
Mainstream commentary since Parrish has taken Suther-
land's, not Hughes's, opinion to be the exemplar of a 'substan-
tive' reading of the Due Process Clauses in political economy
cases. Indeed the principal normative lesson of mainstream
commentary has been that the impact of "due process" in the
realm of political economy should be confined to minimal pro-
cedural requirements, a far cry from Sutherland's essentialist
fundamental principles.
Meanwhile, a now conventional account of constitutional
change from Lochner through Adkins to Parrish had been
launched in the late 1930s.' In that account, the Court was
characterized as recognizing the outmoded nature of the
Lochner majority's approach to police power cases and eventu-
ally abandoning that approach. Critical to the account was its
internalization of Holmes's reading of "liberty of contract" in
police power cases as normative judicial glossing. This enabled
the account to strip the "liberty of contract" doctrine from its
foundationalist moorings in the anticlass principle and the
publiciprivate distinction and to associate it with the ideologi-
cal assumptions of Spencerian libertarianism. Those grounding
Early examples of the account are Corwin, supra note 41, EDWARD S.
CORWiN, CONSTTUTIONAL REVOLUTION, LTD. (1941), and ROBERT JACKSoN, THE
STRUGGLE FOR JUDICIAL SUPREMACY (1941). A persistent theme of the account is
the illegitimacy of the "Old Court's" resistance to the New Deal legislative pro-
grams in the face of widespread popular support for those programs.
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their police power opinions on the maintenance of the pub-
lic/private distinction or the anticlass principle became charac-
terized as reactionaries resisting modern social legislation
designed to relieve inequalities in the industrial marketplace.
Holmes, in contrast, became a heroic figure, exposing "liberty
of contract" as a normative gloss in Lochner and wisely recon-
ciling himself in Adkins to the proposition that "pretty much
all law consists in forbidding men to do some things they want
to do."
If one turns that account on its head, and views early
twentieth century police power jurisprudence as most of its
judicial practitioners did, how does one explain Holmes's role?
How does one make sense of his being a lone jurisprudential
voice in Lochner, and, eighteen years later, still a lone voice in
Adkins? And how, at the same time, does one explain the dra-
matic collapse of Sutherland's interpretation of the jurispru-
dential change from Adkins to Parrish, and the comparably
dramatic rise of Holmes's interpretation? So powerful were
those changes, in fact, that an entire episode of twentieth cen-
tury constitutional history has been "lost" for over fifty years,
and is now only in the process of beginning to be reclaimed.86
" The persistence of the view that a line of decisions resisting "social" legisla-
tion as violating the anticlass principle or inappropriately blurring the pub-
lic/private distinction was an unfortunate exercise in "conservative" judicial over-
reaching has been remarkable. A recent set of essays on the constitutional history
of the New Deal period, WILLIAM LEUCHTENBERG'S, THE SUPREME COURT REBORN
(1995), perpetuates that view. See G. Edward White, Cabining The Constitutional
History of the New Deal in Time, 94 MIcH. L. REV. 1392 (1996).
Recently a group of commentators has sought to revise the conventional view
of 'substantive due process' cases and to recapture some of the starting assump-
tions of late nineteenth and early twentieth century constitutional jurisprudence.
Important contributions to that project are Barry Cushman, A Stream of Legal
Consciousness: The Current of Commerce Doctrine from Swift to Jones & Laughlin,
61 FORDHAM L. REv. 105 (1992); Barry Cushman, Doctrinal Synergies and Liberal
Dilemmas: The Case of the Yellow-Dog Contract, 1992 SUP. CT. REV. 235; Barry
Cushman, Rethinking The New Deal Court, 80 VA. L. REV. 201 (1994); Richard D.
Friedman, Switching Time and Other Thought Experiments: The Hughes Court and
Constitutional Transformation, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 1891 (1994); HOWARD GILLMAN,
THE CONSTITUTION BESEIGED (1993). Much of this work owes a debt to Charles W.
McCurdy's germinal articles on late nineteenth century police power jurisprudence,
Charles W. McGurdy, Justice Field and the Jurisprudence of Government-Business
Relations, 61 J. AM. HIST. 970 (1975) and Charles W. McGurdy, The Roots of
'Liberty of Contract' Reconsidered, 1984 Y.B. SUP. CT. HIST. SOC. 20 (1984); see
also McCurdy's recent overview in The 'Liberty of Contract' Regime in American
Law, supra note 5.
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The place to start in understanding Holmes's jurispruden-
tial isolation in the inappropriately designated 'substantive due
process' cases is the same place from which to begin an expla-
nation of his eventual succession to jurisprudential orthodoxy
and heroic status. It is with a recreation of the foundational
epistemological assumptions that distanced him from his col-
leagues on the Fuller, White, and Taft Courts. Holmes began
police power cases by assuming that "liberty of contract" was a
"dogma." He made that assumption because he largely rejected
a set of orthodox nineteenth century explanations for the order
and meaning of the universe. He did not fully believe that
property, or liberty, were prepolitical rights, invulnerable to
government because they were the basis of government itself.
He did not believe that the universe was solely guided by inex-
orable, essentialist external forces. He did not believe that
there was comparatively little human beings could do to alter
the course of events, whether in the guise of constitutional
interpretation or elsewhere.'
"As with most generalizations about Holmes, there is a danger of overaimpli-
fication here. Holmes was an epistemological modernist, unlike most of his contem-
poraries, in rejecting a belief in the existence of omniscient external forces in the
universe that humans were largely powerless to control. Religion was the principal
such force: early in his career Holmes identified himself with those who felt that
"science" came far closer to unlocking the key to understanding external phenome-
na than religion. Holmes was prepared to press modernist logic even further, con-
cluding that questions about the course of events were at bottom questions of
sovereign power, so that social change was largely a product of the attitudes of
whoever held power at the time.
Holmes added a refinement to his positivism that followed from his being an
American: sovereignty in America was a product of majority will and legislatures
best embodied that will. This version of positivism made Holmes a deferential
judge when he was asked to interpret legislative activity. Outside that sphere of
interpretation, as in common law cases, he assumed that he was the sovereign
and was an activist judge. Thus the principal area of concordance between Holmes
and those who lionized him as the chief critic of 'substantive due process' was a
belief in granting legislatures considerable latitude to respond to social problems.
Both Holmes's deference to legislatures and his acolytes' enthusiasm for legislative
solutions stemmed from modernist assumptions about the primacy of human-based
causation in the universe.
But, as noted, Holmes retained some particularistic attitudes and theories
that had a premodernist origin. His positivism was the logical product of a belief
that humans could and would control their destiny, but at the same time he as-
sumed that there were limits on the powers of humans in the economic market-
place. A similar dialectic characterized his views on free speech, where he spoke of
a 'marketplace of ideas" as determining which expressions would become influen-
tial and which would be discarded, but at the same time anticipated that major-
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On the contrary, Holmes believed that the course of histo-
ry, and the state of human beings in society, was largely a
function of human power and will. He therefore could not see
any theoretical limits on the power of government, which was,
after all, nothing but the aggregate policies of human
powerholders. There were practical limits-humans would re-
volt and displace powerholders if their acts were intolerably
tyrannical or arbitrary-but those limits could not be fixed
dogmatically in advance. It was thus an illusion to talk of
"liberty of contract," or other "liberties," as if they were unas-
sailable timeless principles. They were what a current majority
deemed them to be. The same could be said of the "police pow-
er," the "public interest," and other rubrics for governmental
interference with private activity.
Since Holmes believed that the scope of the police power,
or the boundary between public and private activity, was sim-
ply a question of historical circumstance and majoritarian will,
he found inappropriate a reading of the Due Process Clauses
that held up "liberty of contract" as a barrier to legislative
regulation. Such a reading sought to erect a definition of the
scope of the police power, or its limits, as if it were timeless,
natural, and externally derived. The police power was not
externally derived, he believed; it was just one set of inarticu-
late convictions. All one could say about police power cases was
that the boundary between what sets of activities were public
and what sets remained private would change with time and
circumstance.
No one else on the Lochner Court, and almost no one else
participating in the Adkins decision, held that view of police
power due process cases because among the judges deciding
those cases only Brandeis shared Holmes's epistemological
view of causation in the universe and the component view of
the scope and limits of legislative activity. For the rest of
Holmes's judicial colleagues in Lochner and in Adkins, the pub-
lic/private distinction and the anticlass principle were perma-
ities would invariably seek to repress speech that they disapproved of.
And, of course, although Holmes and those who hailed his Lochner dissent as
an enlightened critique of inappropriately 'substantive' judicial interpretation start-
ed from a similar epistemological place, they differed sharply on the worth of tho
.progressive" legislation being challenged on due process grounds. For a fuller
discussion, see WHITE, supra note 41, at 391-96.
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nent features of republican government in America. For them
to embrace the idea that all legislation was "general" because
all individual transactions bore some connection to the public
welfare, or the corresponding idea that all activity was "public"
if it was thought to have a sufficient impact on the majority of
the people, would have been to abandon a belief in the uni-
verse as being shaped, to an important extent, by forces over
which humans could exert no meaningful control. To abandon
that belief was to embrace the terriying prospect of a modern-
ist world, a world in which the only limits on human behavior
stemmed from humans themselves.
Holmes had long been prepared to embrace that world. He
had abandoned religion as a soldier in the Civil War. His trea-
tise, The Common Law, had embraced historical change and
the methods of scientific empiricism. On the Supreme Judicial
Court of Massachusetts he had reconciled himself to what he
called "the sovereign prerogative of choice."' His combination
of skepticism and instinctive attraction to democracy had led
him to reject natural law, custom, and tradition as jurispru-
dential principles and settle on positivism. Because he em-
braced modernist epistemology, he not only recognized the
human, creative dimensions of judging, he worried about the
contradiction between judicial "lawmaking" and democratic
theory. Hence he settled into a fatalistic deference, acknowl-
edging the primacy of legislative power even though, on many
occasions, he retained a detachment from the substantive goals
of legislators that bordered on contempt.
Those who elevated Holmes's reading of police power due
process cases to authoritative status found it "natural" and
compelling because they shared Holmes's modernism. For the
most part they were not Holmes's chronological contemporar-
ies. They had experienced some of the shock waves of an ur-
banizing and industrializing world: global war, depression, the
increased primacy of science and technology. They did not see
the universe as mysterious, nor external forces as omniscient.
They were eager to control their own destiny, and they be-
lieved that law could play an important role in that process.
They were by no means convinced that when conditions
' Oliver Wendell Holmes, Law in Science and Science in Law, 12 HARV. L
REV. 443, 461 (1899).
1997]
BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW
changed the Constitution was powerless to adopt its language
to them. Instead they saw constitutional language as human-
crafted and malleable.
As legislators, judges, and commentators, Holmes's aco-
lytes transformed the public/private distinction into a virtually
meaningless blur and confined the anticlass principle to the
orthodoxy of another time. Then, looking back on the actions of
their juristic predecessors, they wondered why it had taken
them so long to grasp some simple truths, why they had in-
vested concepts such as "liberty of contract" with so much
ideological weight. Their modernist premises, in fact, dictated
that they would take "liberty of contract" as nothing but a
human-created ideological "dogma." So they labeled those
whose invocation of "liberty of contract" revealed their belief in
the foundational principles of orthodox police power jurispru-
dence as 'conservatives.' And they labeled foundationalist in-
terpretations of the Due Process Clauses as 'substantive.'
They also extracted Holmes from his posture of isolation
and made him into a 'progressive' visionary. To succeeding
generations, their account of Lochner and other early twentieth
century 'substantive due process' cases has proceeded from
congenial epistemological assumptions and made sense of
much of twentieth century constitutional history. Consequent-
ly, few have taken the trouble to ask whether the account was
grounded in an understanding of the jurisprudential assump-
tions of most of the judges who decided the cases. Now that
some commentators have begun to ask that question, the inter-
pretation of Holmes's acolytes is unraveling. With its demise,
two new sets of conclusions may emerge. The first set may
center on a renewed appreciation of the epistemological isola-
tion of Holmes from his contemporaries. The second set may
center on the proposition that one can no longer think of early
twentieth century police power cases as 'substantive due pro-
cess' cases without distorting their meaning. Perhaps, by com-
bining these sets of conclusions, we can begin to strip away the
pejorative overtures of the term "Lochernizing" in contempo-
rary constitutional jurisprudence.
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